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OLUNTARY wage and price guidelines have
now been adopted as a major element in the Govern-
ment’s anti-inflation program. The pricing behavior of
firms and wage demands of labor are considered by a
large portion of the population to be incompatible
with the social objective of reducing inflation. Re-
straint in wage and price movements is believed to be
necessary. Monetary and fiscal restraint alone appar-
ently have been judged as either not being able to
accomplish this objective or as carrying too high a
cost, in terms of lost output and employment.~
Although the guideline approach is popular with
the public, remarkably little discussion has been di-
rected toward its implications.2 In particular, the
probable efficiency and distributional consequences
of the program have received little public attention.
The Administration has set explicit numerical stand-
ards for wage and price increases.3 The basic guide-
lines specify that annual increases in wage and fringe
benefits be held below 7 percent and that price in-
creases be limited to 0.5 percent less than their an-
nual rate of increase during 1976-77.~An alternative
test for firms is to apply a “profit-test.” If a firm can-
not meet the price standard, it is requested to limit
its pre-tax profit margin on sales to the average of
the best two of the past three years. In addition, total
profit increases must be below a 6.5 percent ceiling,
unless accounted for by volume increases.
firms sharing equally in the burden of lowering in-
flation.5 The target for inflation is 6 to 6.5 percent
over the first year of the program. In order to reach
these objectives, the program’s aim is to have prices
rise at the same rate as unit labor costs, with average
wage increases of 7 percent minus 1.75 percentage
points for projected productivity growth yielding an
inflation rate of 5,25 percent. The Administration al-
lows an additional 0.5 percent for “legislatively man-
dated payroll costs” and arrives at a rate of 5.75 per-
cent.° The Administration states: “The wage/price
standards are designed to serve as guides for the be-
havior of decision-making agents who have discre-
tionary power over the prices and the wages that they
receive.”7 [emphasis added]
While the guidelines are “voluntary,” the Adminis-
tration has emphasized its intention to compel firms
to comply by manipulating both Federal procurement
policy and the Government’s broad regulatory author-
ity. The program also encourages that the force of
public exhortation be directed at those large firms
which exhibit “excessive” price increases.
The Administration has requested that Congress
pass a “real wage insurance” program. Under this
scheme, workers who meet the pay standard will re-
ceive a tax rebate if the rate of inflation exceeds 7
percent. l’he purpose of the rebate is to reduce
workers’ fear of cooperation by insuring that they
will not have their purchasing power reduced if the
rate of inflation is not held to less than 7 percent.8
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The program requires that deceleration of prices be
achieved in each market, purportedly with individual
~Thi
5
conclusion is clearly stated in White Paper: The Presi-
dent’s Anti-Inflation Program (accompanied the President’s
announcement of the guidcline program on October 24, 1978)
pp. 1-4. 2
A recent public opinion po
11
demonstrates the popularity of
the adopted guideline policy. In a November 1978 Harris Poll
63 percent of the respondents supported the program. See
Louis Harris, “Americans Support Anti-Inflation Plan,” St.
Louis Globe-Democrat, October 20, 1978.
31
n this article the word “standards” is used interchangeably
with guidelines and guideposts. For details of the program
see U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability, Fact Book:
Wage and Price Standards issued October 31, 1978.
~Ihid. pp. 20-40. The pay standard applies not to individual
workers but to average pay increases for “groups” of workers.
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The price standards are directed at individual firms and apply
to an “overall average price” and not to specific products.
5
See White Paper, p. 7.
6
Fact Book, pp. 15-16. Even with widespread compliance, the
Adirunistration concedes that prices will probably rise within
the range of 6 to 6.5 percent. This would represent, however,
an improvement over the first six months of 1978 when prices
rose at a1 0percent annual rate.
~Ibid. p. 16. The paragraph continues: “Thus, standards are
not directly relevant to pricing behavior in those markets in
which prices are determined by the impersonal workings of
supply and demand.” The program exempts raw materials and
auction type markets which include (1) prices of agricultural
and industrial raw materials, (2) interest rates, and (3) prices
which historically have moved in tandem with an organized
open exchange market.
8
Note that a 7 percent pay increase and a7percent inflation
rate gives zero increase in real income before taxes — even if
productivity rises 1.75 percent. Given the progression in the
income tax structure, real income (after taxes) declines. See
Nancy Jianakopolos, “Paying More Taxes and Affording It
Less,” this Review (July 1975), pp. 9-13.Voluntary wage and price standards can he classi-
fied as an “incomes policy”. This generic term, loosely
defined, includes all of those actions taken by a gov-
ernment to affect the level of money incomes or
prices by actively participating in wage and price
decisionmaking.
Although more popular in European countries, a
wide range of incomes policies havebeen tried in the
United States in recent years.° Included have been
relatively weak attempts to persuade or “jawbone”
specific firms and workers to hold down wage or price
increases in the spirit of social responsibility.10 Such a
program was adopted during the Kennedy Administra-
tion and carried over into the early years of the John-
son Administration. At the other extreme, incomes pol-
icies have included former President Nixon’s rigid
program of mandatory criteria for wage and price
behavior throughout the entire economy. Guidelines
represent an attempt to achieve a compromise between
the two extremes. By strengthening the persuasive
element used under the jawboning method while at-
tempting to avoid the harsh consequences of strict
wage and price controls, guidelines represent a politi-
cally tempting route.
The acceptance of voluntary wage and price
standards as an alternative prescription for reducing
the general rate of inflation stems from the idea that
inflation is generated by “cost-push” factors. This
view describes how rising wages, the largest com-
ponent of business costs, continually force prices
upward. The resulting inflation is known to the pub-
lic as a wage-price spiral. A similar version of this
view concludes that inflation is the consequence of
increases in the market power of firms and labor over
the prices they charge. According to this analysis,
prices and wages are “administered” by large firms
and trade unions without regard to competitive mar-
ket forces.
9
For historical surveys of incomes policy in the United States
and abroad see U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office,
Incomes Policies in the United States: Historical Review and
Some Issues, May 1977; Lloyd Ulman and Robert J. Flana-
gan, Wage Restraint: A Study of Incomes Policies in Western
Europe (Berkeley, California: University of California l’ress,
1971); Walter Galenson, ed., Incomes Policy: What Can We
Learn From Europe? (Ithaca, New York~: ~New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University,
1973); and Craufurd 1). Goodwin, ed., Exhortation and Con-
trols: The Search for Wage-Price Policy, 1945-1971 (Wash-
ington, l).C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975).
10
These efforts are sometimes referred to as “moral suasion.”
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The cost-push view has great popular appeal since
it depicts the inflation process as a struggle for in-
come shares between capitalists and workers. How-
ever, economic theory reveals that many implications
of this vie\v of inflation are illogical or, at best, ques-
tionable.h1 It is argued that monopoly power exists in
the market place and that firms have the ability to
push prices above competitive levels and raise the
average price level. l3ut this analysis ignores the ques-
tion of why the monopolies had been charging less
than the high monopoly price.
The theory of monopoly pricing predicts that firms
which have protection from the entry of competitors
into their markets are able to receive prices above
those of competitive markets. Once the monopoly
price has been achieved, however, further increases
are limited to the opportunities provided by the mar-
ket. If monopoly power is now causing prices to rise,
either monopoly power is increasing or monopolists
had been behaving irrationally and have just discov-
ered their market advantage. There is little evidence to
support either alternative.12
Undeniably, many cconomic groups exhibit enough
market power to influence the level of certain prices
and wages. These monopoly prices are higher than
they would be if the specific market were competi-
tive. But, except for a slight rise due to the resource
misallocation, the overall level of prices and wages
will remain substantially mlehanged. ~ For example,
if wages in a particular industry are pushed up above
competitive levels less employment will result. Labor
will then be released for use in other sectors where a
downward pressure on wages will result until a nesv
equilibrium is reached. More importantly, however,
this analysis is unable to explain persistent increases
in prices, month after month, year after year.
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An alternative theory is that inflation is a monetary
phenomenon. This view holds that changes in money
tmt
See George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Home-
wood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), pp. 244-45
and Milton Friedman, “What Price Guideposts?”, Guidelines:
Informal Controls and the Market Place, ed., George P. Shultz
and Robert Z. Aliber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1966), pp. 17-39.
tm1
For a snn’ey of the evidence regarding the relationship be-
tween market concentration and price changes see Steven
Lnstgarten, Industrial Concentration and Inflation (Wash—
inglon, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1975).
nOne purpose of a union monopoly, for exampk, might be to
gain real wage benefits for its rank and file. To accomplish
this obiective the uniosi has several alternatives available to
it. It may try to reduce the supply of labor through restric-
tive licensing practices or by not allowing non-union ‘yorkers
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growth exert a strong influence on total spending in
the economy. When people find that they are holding
cash balances which are greater than desired, they
spend the excess money on real and financial assets
and bid up their prices.
The monetary view does not deny the existence of a
wage-price spiral, but interprets the cost-push analysis
as a confusion of the cause and effect relationships of
the inflation process. According to the monetary view,
the observed patterns of wage and price adjustments
are normal responses to excessive money growth. For
inflation to persist, the higher prices, no matter where
they originate, must be validated by increases in the
money supply. V:ith money growth held constant,
price increases can be maintained only through re-
duced production and employment. For such a sit-
uation to persist, businesses would have to willingly
accept lower profits and labor would voluntarily re-
main unemployed and refuse to accept employment
at lower wages. The empirical evidence does not
support such irrational behavior.14 Only when mone-
tary authorities actively ensure that the spiral is fully
augmented through increases in the money supply,
will inflation result.
The underlying requirement for a successful guide-
line policy is that firms and wage-earners restrain
themselves from acting economically as individuals.
In a market economy the motive of individual self-
interest is crucial, Consumer preferences are revealed
through the market by nonrestricted opportunities
and/or purchases of goods and services at their mar-
ket price. These prices reflect not only the costs of
production, but also the nature of demand for the
good in question. The free movement of prices and
the consequent incentives and disincentives that are
created assure that resources in the economy will
move toward satisfying these individual demands.
An appeal for individual restraint conflicts with a
very basic economic observation about human be-
havior — consumers naturally strive to maximize their
individual well-being. Economic self-interest is the
major motivating factor behind economic activity.
Guidelines, on the other hand, represent rules that
substitute “social responsibility” for self-interest.
The conflict between the two views is glaring. Eco-
nomic incentives argue against individual compliance
to obtain jobs. Secondly, the union might seek a higher
wage through collective bargaining and thus accept the un-
employment forthcoming at this higher wage.
14
See Denis S. Kamosky, “The Effect of Market Expectations on
Employment, Wages and Prices,” Working Paper #17, Fed-
eralReserve Bank of St. Louis.
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with the social motives and wealth is transferred to
those who stand apart from the program.
The Kennedy Administration guideposts of 1962-67
represent a prime example of these conflicts. This
voluntary program established upper wage limits
which were equal to overall productivity gains for the
economy.13 The problem which resulted in the demise
of the productivity rule was that the guideline prin-
ciples did not take into account the fundamental
pressure created by accelerated money growth.
When the productivity guidelines were initially
adopted, the trend of productivity growth was sub-
stantially above the rise in consumer prices. Wages
based on the productivity rule thus provided for
growth in real wages (money wages adjusted for
price changes). As money growth accelerated and
inflationary pressures intensified in 1965 and 1966,
the wage standard became viewed as unfair. Labor,
discovering that the purchasing power of their wages
was falling, found the argument for holding down
wages unacceptable. As key settlements began to ex-
ceed the guideposts, the program was abandoned.
The degree of compliance with price guidelines
will be associated with the severity of the penalties
against those who choose to ignore them. If the con-
trols are truly voluntary and involve no costs for
violation, there is little chance that they will succeed
since gains from noncompliance can he realized with-
out costs. If economic sanctions are used against vio-
lators, however, each firm will weigh the expected
costs and benefits involved. If the expected costs of
noncompliance are less than the benefits, the firm
will choose to ignore the guidelines.’6 Avoidance
can also take the form of “black-market” transactions
above the controlled price or product quality changes.
Though the burden of the program is intended
to be equally shared, this will not be the case. Gov-
ernment penalties through procurement policy will
not affect private decisions in a uniform fashion.
Some firms are dependent upon either government
purchases of their output or are directly influenced
by government policies. Other firms, however, may be
outside the range of government sanction. Holding
down the price of particular goods by penalties ben-
efits the purchasers of these goods and the sellers of
unaffected competitive goods. The losers are the
sellers of the controlled goods, those prospective
buyers of the controlled goods who can no longer
15
The Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the
President (Washington, D.C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 1962), pp. 185-90.
‘OThe same type of “cost-benefit analysis” will occur when
labor contemplates compliance with wage guidelines and
the rebate scheme which supplement them.obtain them, and the purchasers of the competitive
goods. The losses exceed the gains because of the
misallocation of resources.
The proposed “real wage insurance” plan which
would supplement the guidelines, if enacted, serves to
shift the burden of compliance among economic
groups. If certain workers are guaranteed a constant
real wage, the forthcoming rebates could reduce real
incomes to the rest of the nation provided there is an
increase in the federal deficit. To the extent that these
larger deficits are “monetized”, inflationary pressures
will be supplemented, thereby reducing the wealth of
all holders of money and monetary instruments,mT
The real-wage insurance program is said to be
capable of breaking inflationary psychology and be
able to bring about more rapidly the achievement of
price stability. Lower expectations of inflation in the
future, according to this view, would translate into
lower demands for wage increases and eventually
lower prices. This viewpoint, however, confuses how
inflation expectations develop. Expectations per se do
not cause inflation. Curbing expectations will require
controlling of the underlying force which causes them
to prevail. If price controls only delay the upward
thrust of prices caused by expansive money growth,
expectations of future inflation will not be reduced,
If inflation expectations are not reduced by slower
monetary growth, the longer-run objective of reaching
price stability will be abandoned. For example, since
17
For an analysis of the administrative problem with the “real-
wage insnrance’ program, see Gardner Ackley, “Okun’s New
Tax-Based Incomes Policy Proposal,” Economic Outlook USA
(Winter 1978), pp. 8-9.
market pressures will eventually push prices upward,
reaching the objectives of wage stabilization in the
future will be made more difficult. Following a period
of controls, a stable wage structure is far more likely
to allow a resumption of moderate rates of wage in-
crease than a structure in which distortions, perpet-
uated by public policies, require rapid readjustment
at the bargaining table. Experience with this type of
wage-price explosion” is well documented from
European experience with control programs.’8
~ B:3\i~:~31)ISJB)B AJND( oN~TROII
Most economists agree that, for the sake of effi-
ciency, relative wages and prices should remain flex-
ible. Relations among the wages of workers of differ-
ent skills and of workers in different localities,
industries or even firms should be allowed to vary
according to changes in demand and supply. For
example, firms which are growing have an incentive
to hire scarce resources (labor and capital) away
from other firms. Consequently, if upper limits are
imposed upon the payments that can be offered to
attract scarce inputs, the firms will not be able to
meet the demand for their output. Relative prices,
therefore, should he allowed to move in order to allo-
cate resources into their most productive uses.
The dynamic character of the U.S. economy is evi-
dent from Tables I and II. The tables display that
changes in employment and prices have varied across
industries. Some industries have experienced rapid
productivity growth; others have not. Employment
growth has varied from industry to industry and gen-
erally reflects underlying demand conditions. The
application of a single price and wage standard to
all situations ignores this ongoing adjustment process
tm8
Ulman and Flanagan, Wage Restraint, p. 223.
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Table I
Productivity Changes for Selected Industries, 1971-76




Synthetic Fiber u 7.4
Wet Corn Milling 7.2
Aluminum Rolling & Drawing 5 5
Phariniaceulicol Pruparations 4.3






Copper Rolling & Drawing —1.7
Coal Mining --4.3
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Wages, Prices and Employment by
Industry (1971-77)





Manutacluring 6.O°,~ 1.0% 7.7%
Canslructian 8.2 1.1 5.7
Services 7.3 3.8 7.7
Trade 6.5 3.1 6.4
Finance 4.9 2.8 6.6
Communications 3.4 0.9 9.9
Transportation 5.9 0.8 7.7
Utilities 8.9 1.1 7.8
Mining 18.2 5.1 9.6
Agriculture 9.5 2.7 6.5
—ttr:inrs.’ in mmli,-.: GNP o li-c iicfl-onr by iiiilu_tiy.
‘‘~‘L,l:_I-r.mliii ,ivh_tinit,smu.l,i~ci..
r ei,I.,hir i mmiii,.. mr ruu_hmuis.,m-.u:~silcrmI.i’mj,Iovcs-.
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and confuses movements in relative prices (shifts of
resources between economic groups) and the general
level of prices. To minimize efficiency losses, it would
be necessary to keep a watchful eye on individual
wage and price relationships and make exceptions
based on individual market situations. A tradeoff is
therefore faced by the polieymaker. The more strin-
gent the guideline (less exceptions) the greater the
efficiency losses, On the other hand, “weak” guide-
lines are not likely to gain the acceptance of the popu-
lace who judge the probable success of the guidelines
by the strictness of the program. The program is
therefore unlikely to reduce inflation expectations.
Implicit in the decision of who should be covered
by guidelines are important judgments regarding the
distribution of income among industries and be-
tween the factors of production. In other words, con-
trol programs politicize questions of income distribu-
tion. In a market economy, relative prices are signals
that allocate society’s resources into their most pro-
ductive uses. Reflecting changing market conditions,
these relative prices are always in motion and are
independent of political criteria for distributing in-
come between economic groups. Any guideline based
on a simple percentage price increase for all individ-
ual firms, however, is implicitly centered on an ac-
ceptance of wage and price relationships (at the time
of policy implementation) as stable ones and assumes
that the relationships will remain fixed throughout
the period of the guidelines.
Direct government controls, therefore, offer little
inducement for the efficient development and use of
resources, and contain no automatic mechanism for
resource adjustments and the alleviation of shortages
or excesses in production. Rather than being an aid
to growth and vitality, they lead to retardation of
economic resiliency and replace market forces by
political ones.
The U.S. experience with control programs dem-
onstrates these market misallocations. Price controls
during World War II resulted in the substitution of
low-quality goods for higher quality goods and black
markets were commonplace as individuals developed
lack of respect for the law. In later years, subsidies
to producers became an increasing part of the con-
trol program as fixed prices were insufficient to provide
the necessary incentives for production. Recent vol-
untary programs were also unable to avoid selective
scarcities. For example, the Kennedy guideposts were
blamed for shorffails in supply of aluminum and sul-
fur and potential users were forced into using costly
substitutes. Similarly, under the Nixon Administration
controls, shortages developed for zinc, lead, steel, fer-
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The W62-66 Guideposts Period
Annual Pe ontege Chars as
M ~ WIP
1962 ZZ% 03% 11%
1963 29 —03 1.2
19M 40 02 13
1965 4,3 20 LI
966 4 33 29
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tilizer, petiochemieal products and a long list of other
products.
The program is further complicated by the timing
of monetary action. In order to validate decelerating
inflationary pressures, it will be necessary to supple-
ment the program by tighter monetary action — re-
ducing growth in the money supply. But a problem
exists in the timing of monetary actions and the con-
trol policy. Relations observed in the past indicate
that previous changes in the money supply have ef-
fects on current variables — the pattern of aggregate
spending is determined by past monetary actions.’°
A perfectly timed effort by monetary and price con-
trol authorities will be difficult to achieve.
The apparent failure of the Kennedy and Nixon
control programs to reduce inflation can be inter-
preted in a monetary framework, A monetary explana-
tion for the failure of the 1962 guideposts is evident
in Table III. When the guidelines were adopted,
consumer prices were rising at a moderate 0.7 percent
rate. (The average change in the Wholesale Price In-
dex between 1958 and 1964 was near zero.) Through-
out the life of the guideposts (1962-66), however,
money growth increased steadily each year. The
money stock grew 1 percent per year from 1959 to
1961, but increased steadily each year of the pro-
gram.2° Correspondingly, prices and wages moved
upsvard reactingto the more rapid growth of spending.
When the program was abandoned in 1966, consumer
prices were rising at the rate of 3 percent.
During. the Nixon price control period (1971-74),
money growth data reveals that the controls camou-
19
0ne study which provides a more detailed statement of the
theory and evidence supporting these conclusions is Leonall
C. Andersen and Keith NI. Carison, ‘A Monetarist Model for
Economic Stabilization,” this Review (April 1970), pp. 7-25.
20
Empirieal support for the money-price relationship for the
period 1955 to 1971 is presented by Denis S. Karnosky’s,
“The Link Between Money and Prices — 197 1-76,” this
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flage a period of overly ex-
pansive monetary policy
during the 1970’s. Although
non-monetary factors (the
oil embargo and the shock
of controls) temporarilyin-
fluenced the money-price
relationship, the growth of
the price level by 1975 par-
alleled that rate predicted
by the trend growth of
money.21
Movements in the rate of
inflation have been closely
associated with movements
in the trend growth of the
money stock. The accom-
panying chart shows that
both U.S. control periods
Trends and Fluctuations of Money, Prices, Output, and Unemployment
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since World War II have
been marked by money growth above its long-run
trend. Correspondingly, in both cases rates of change
in prices eventually moved upward reflecting this
long-run trend.
Without curtailing aggregate spending, individual
demands will be simply shifted among controlled and
uncontrolled goods.22 Holding prices below their mar-
ket clearing levels will increase the quantity de-
manded of controlled goods. If total spending is not
reduced through monetary or fiscal actions, those who
are unlucky and do not receive the goods that would
have been supplied without controls, will shift their
spending to other products which represent, in most
cases, close substitutes. The increased demand in tin-
controlled markets will put upward pressure on these
prices.
“Voluntary” wage and price guidelines haverecently
been adopted as an accompanying policy alongside
the more traditional economic stabilization tools of
monetary and fiscal policy. By establishing rules for
pricing behavior, the Administration hopes to dampen




The word “controlled” refers equally to those “voluntary” re-
sponses that are reactions to government sanctions.
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According to the monetary view of inflation, the
logical foundation of the control program confuses the
results and causes of inflation. According to this view,
inflation results when money growth persistently ex-
ceeds growth in the amount of money demanded. The
observed wage and price adjustment (the so-called
wage-price spiral) are but parts of the general re-
sponse in the economy to excessive money growth.
Inflation expectations, which are generated by exces-
sive money growth, will be reduced only when the
growth rate of money is slowed.
Any short-term benefits received from strict com-
pliance with the guidelines will be costly. The uncon-
strained market system provides an efficient signaling
system for moving resources between alternative uses.
Any control framework will probably conflict with
these price signals and will cause distortions which
reduce the resiliency of the market system to changing
market conditions. The emergence of black-markets
and disguised price increases through reduced product
quality are two examples of devices that have arisen
in responseto previous programs and may arise in the
current program to circumvent the controls.
Past incomes policies in the U.S. have been unable
to reduce inflationary pressure because monetary ac-
tions remained expansive. If monetary actions remain
expansive throughout the current program, acceler-
ated inflation appears inevitable. The fundamental
forces of supply and demand cannot be repealed
through ang type of control program.
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